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I had sleepless nights considering the topic for this inaugural address. I have spent the 
largest proportion of my academic career working in the field of agricultural economics, 
with a particular interest in agricultural marketing and agribusiness.  I considered this as 
a potential focus for my address.  It would have been the easier option for me and a 
topic that would possibly have had the widest appeal.   
 
My experience of inaugural lectures is that the presenters often provide their audience 
with a description of the work they have been involved in during their careers and the 
results of their work.  Despite getting to the wrong end of my career, I have decided to 
address work that I plan to engage in during the remaining years of my academic career. 
When I was appointed at Rhodes University just over 4 years ago, I came from an 
agricultural economics department to an economics department.  I needed to reinvent 
myself in terms of what I was going to teach and research, the closest course to my 
previous discipline that was taught at Rhodes was environmental and resource 
economics and so I grasped the opportunity.  The University put out a call at the 
beginning of 2011 for departments in Law and Commerce to submit proposals for a 
funded research focus area.  Prof Jen Snowball and I decided to put forward a proposal 
in the field of environmental and natural resource economics.  After a number of 
versions of the proposal, we thought that it was rather good and submitted it to the 
Research Office and it was duly returned to us with a comment along the lines of “what 
makes your research area different from similar research being carried out elsewhere?”  
This was a valid comment and we went back to the drawing board.  We thought about 
this for some time and took the brave or brainless decision to look at the subject from 
an institutional economics point of view.  Economists for the most part hold on the 
crutch of theory, hard data and econometric techniques in their research and are 
somewhat lost without them.  Venturing into the realm of qualitative analysis required 
for institutional economic research, which is more the sphere of anthropologists and 
sociologists, makes economists rather uneasy.  The institutional economics approach we 
decided upon and the University’s decision to award us the research focus area helped 
me decide on this topic for my inaugural address. 
 
Concerns about the environment, pollution and exploitation of the world’s resources 
came from an unexpected movement of the 1960s and 1970s – the Hippies. Apart from 
their predisposition to sex, drugs and rock and roll, they advocated alternative lifestyles, 
clean and sustainable energy, and unadulterated foods and were at the forefront of 
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demonstrations against nuclear weapons and environmental disasters. The hippie 
movement eventually morphed into the first Green Movement.  Environmental issues 
were also evident in the music of the era, with artists like Joni Mitchell, the Moody 
Blues and Kansas.  As a bit of an interlude from listening to my voice, concentrate on the 
words of ‘How is it (we are here)’, which was a song from the Moody Blues album ‘A 
Question of Balance’ in 1970.  The hippies and the musicians were ahead of the game in 
this respect. 
 
Genesis of Environmental Legislation 
Exploitation of resources and pollution have been with us for since ancient times, but 
the level of exploitation has generally been less than the critical level for resources and 
the pollution was comparatively less than could be assimilated by nature.  It was 
therefore not considered a problem.  However, King Edward I of England prohibited the 
burning of coal in London in 1272 because smoke had become a problem in the city – 
the first occurrence of pollution legislation. 
 
Today we are bombarded with issues of environmental problems and scenarios with 
dire consequences for the world population, such as climate change with its 
concomitant problems of melting ice caps, rising sea levels, extreme weather patterns, 
depletion of the ozone layer and rising temperatures. There is also the over-exploitation 
of the earth’s resources, such as, inter alia. oil, minerals, forests and fish stocks. 
However, these issues have only been newsworthy for a relatively short period.  In 
addition, there are all the conventions and protocols such as Kyoto, Rio, Rio+10, Rio+20, 
COP 1 – 18, Montreal and Stockholm, which have attempted to address the situation.   
 
The problem of pollution only became a substantive concern after World War II, as a 
result of atomic warfare and nuclear testing. The first modern environmental legislation 
was the Clean Air Act of 1956 in the United Kingdom following The Great Smog of 1952, 
which killed 4 000 people. This was followed by legislation in the United States between 
the mid 1950s and the early 1970s. 
 
A number of severe incidents helped increase the awareness of the impacts of pollution. 
These include the dumping of PCB (polychlorinated biphenyl) in the Hudson River in 
1974 and the dumping of hexavalent chromium in California, which led to legal 
proceedings and to a major settlement for the people of Hinckley – this was made into a 
film starring Julia Roberts as Erin Brockovich. The coming of the nuclear age with its 
potential disasters and the disposal of nuclear waste exacerbated the situation. The 
disasters at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl and the more recent cases after the 
tsunami in Japan have reinforced the scepticism of the public.  The catastrophes such as 
the Exxon Valdes oil spill in the Prince William Sound, Alaska and the Bhopal disaster in 
India demonstrate the magnitude of these problems.  The implications of pollution on 
the atmosphere and oceans for climate change transcend borders have become a global 
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concern.  The most recent concern is the group of chemicals called persistent organic 
compounds, which are resistant to environmental degradation and have been found in 
ecological habitats far from source of industrial activity. 
 
How does this relate to economics? As with the rise of environmental and resource 
concerns, environmental and ecological economics are relatively recent additions to the 
field of economics. Environmental economics did not come into its own until the 1970s 
and ecological economics even later. This does not mean that issues of the environment 
and natural resource use were not addressed by the classical and neo-classical 
economists. Adam Smith in his famous treatise ‘The Wealth of Nations’ in 1776, was the 
first writer to systemise the argument for the importance of markets in allocating 
resources.  Robert Malthus, who was responsible for economics receiving the dubious 
name of the ‘dismal science’, gave rise to the idea that a given quantity of land, a 
continual positive population growth and diminishing returns in agriculture would result 
in a propensity for output per capita to decrease over time and lead to a situation of 
famine. David Ricardo, expanded on the work of Malthus, and explained that 
agricultural production could be expanded by using the land more intensively or 
bringing new land into production. He conceded that, as ‘economic rent’ was 
appropriated, diminishing returns to land could result in a movement to a Malthusian 
state.  John Stuart Mill decreased the gloom regarding the dire consequences of a rising 
population by recognising the countervailing influence of the growth of knowledge and 
technological progress in agriculture and in production. The modern day ‘neo-
malthusians’ are again questioning whether the increases in technology will be able to 
keep pace with the current population growth or will we be heading for a similar 
Malthusian conclusion. 
 
In the 1870s and later, a number of significant published works, including Alfred 
Marshall’s Principles of Economics in 1890, replaced classical economics with what 
became known as ‘neoclassical economics’.  There were changes in the way concepts 
were viewed by economists. Classical economists saw value as arising from labour 
power embodied in output, whereas the neoclassical view was that value was 
determined in exchange, so price and value ceased to be distinct.  The previous ideas of 
absolute scarcity and value were substituted by the concept of relative values (prices) 
determined by supply and demand. At a practical level, the concept of marginal analysis 
was adopted, allowing for the notions of diminishing returns of the classical school to be 
afforded a formal basis in terms of diminishing marginal productivity, derived from an 
explicit production function.  Natural resources were introduced into the neoclassical 
theories of growth in the 1970s when they first systematically investigated the efficient 
and optimal depletion of resources.  The neoclassical expression of Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand shows that, given certain strict conditions, an economy organised as a 
competitive market economy will attain a state of economic efficiency. If these 
conditions do not hold, a state of ‘market failure’ is said to exist and markets are less 
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than efficient. One manifestation of market failure is the phenomenon of externalities, 
which is a major concern in environmental economics. 
 
What is Institutional Economics? 
 
Before delving into the concept of institutional economics, it will be useful to explain 
what is meant by institutions because institutions in economics have a particular 
meaning. The most commonly agreed upon definition for institutions is a set of formal 
and informal rules of conduct that facilitate coordination or govern relationships 
between individuals or groups. The formal rules include laws, contracts, political 
systems, organisations, and markets, while the informal rules of conduct consist of 
norms, traditions, customs, value systems, religions and sociological trends. Institutions 
provide for more certainty in human interaction (North, 1990) and have an influence on 
outcomes such as economic performance, efficiency, economic growth and 
development.  They can either benefit or hinder these economic measures. 
 
Williamson (2000) noted that new institutional economics operates at both the macro 
and micro levels.  The macro level deals with the institutional environment, or the rules 
of the game, which affect the behaviour and performance of economic actors and in 
which organisational forms and transactions are embedded.  Williamson (1993) 
described it as the set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that 
establish the basis for production, exchange and distribution.  The micro level analysis 
known as the institutional arrangement, on the other hand, deals with the institutions 
of governance.  These refer to the modes of managing transaction costs and include 
issues of social capital, property rights and collective action.  Here the focus is on the 
individual transaction and the questions regarding organisational forms (private 
property versus common pool resources) are analysed.  An institutional arrangement is 
an arrangement between economic units that govern the ways in which its members 
can co-operate or compete. 
 
It is also useful to distinguish institutions from organisations.  Organisations can be 
defined as the players in the game.  Many institutions are organisations, for instance, 
households, firms and co-operatives.  Other types of institutions, on the other hand, are 
not organisations, such as money and the law. 
 
Institutional economics focuses on understanding the role of the evolutionary process 
and the role of institutions in shaping economic behaviour.  Its name and central 
elements were first introduced in a 1919 American Economic Review article by William 
Hamilton.  In listing a number of perceived attributes of this school, he claimed that 
institutional economics alone could unify economic science by showing how parts of the 
economic system related to the whole.  Thus, institutional economics emphasises a 
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broader study of institutions and views the economic system as a result of the complex 
interaction of various institutions such as individuals, firms, states and social norms. 
 
Recent writings refer to the widespread term “new institutional economics”, which is 
associated with an extensive literature base.  The temporal adjective is attached to 
differentiate this broad set of post-world war II theories and approaches from the “old” 
institutional economics of Thorstein Veblen, John Commons and Wesley Mitchell.  
Hodgson (1998) indicates that the earlier institutionalism had been dominant in 
economics departments in the time following World War I.  After 1930, the “old” 
institutional economics declined and was repeatedly written off and dismissed for failing 
to provide a systematic and viable approach to economic theory.  It was believed that 
institutionalism was essentially anti-theoretical and descriptive.  There is some 
justification for the dismissive statements as there had been a failure of the “old” 
institutionalists to agree upon or even develop a systematic theoretical core.  One of the 
primary reasons for the failure of old institutionalism lies in the shifts in social science 
and the rise of a mathematical style among neo-classical economists.  Behaviourist 
psychology and positivist philosophy displaced the instinct psychology and pragmatist 
philosophy upon which the early institutionalism had been built.  The use of 
mathematical techniques in economics caught the imagination of both theorists and 
policy makers and, by comparison, institutional economics was regarded as less rigorous 
and thereby inferior. 
 
The central ideas behind institutionalism concern institutions, habits, rules and their 
evolution.  However, institutionalists do not attempt to build a single general model 
based on those ideas.  Instead, the ideas facilitate a strong movement towards specific 
and historically located approaches to analysis.  In this respect, there is a similarity 
between institutionalism and biology.  The institutionalist approach moves from general 
ideas concerning human agency, institutions and the evolutionary nature of economic 
processes to specific ideas and theories, related to specific economic institutions or 
types of economy.  Accordingly, there are multiple levels and types of analysis. 
 
By contrast, neoclassical economics moves from a universal theoretical framework 
concerning rational choice and behaviour, and moves directly to theories of price, 
economic welfare, and so on.  The term neoclassical economics, ironically coined by 
Veblen, may be conveniently defined as an approach which 
1. Assumes rational, maximising behaviour by agents with given and stable 
preference functions, 
2. Focuses on attained, or movement toward, equilibrium states, and 
3. Excludes chronic information problems such as uncertainty. 
This positive approach assumes that any changes will automatically and seamlessly 
result in a shift to a state of equilibrium. (Demand and Supply slide) 
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The new institutional economics acknowledges the important role of institutions, but 
argues that one can analyse institutions within the framework of neo-classical 
economics.  In other words, under new institutional economics, some of the unrealistic 
assumptions of neo-classical economics (such as perfect competition, zero transaction 
costs, full rationality) are relaxed, but the assumption of self-seeking individuals 
attempting to maximise an objective function subject to constraints still holds.  
Furthermore, institutions are incorporated as an additional constraint under the NIE 
framework.  As Langlois (1986, p5), quoted by Kirsten (2002), put it, “the problem with 
many of the early institutionalists is that they wanted an economics with institutions but 
without theory; the problem with the neo-classicists is that they want economic theory 
without institutions; what the New Institutional Economics tries to do is to provide an 
economics with both theory and institutions.” 
 
The characteristic “new” institutionalist project is the attempt to explain the emergence 
of institutions, such as the firm or the state, by reference to a model of rational 
behaviour, tracing out the unintended consequences in terms of human interactions.  In 
this respect, an initial institution-free “state of nature” is assumed.  The explanatory 
movement is from individuals to institutions, taking individuals as given.  Hodgson (1998) 
refers to the work of Carl Menger (1892) who saw the institution of money as 
emanating in an unplanned manner from the communications and interactions of 
individual agents.  Once practical regularities become prominent, a circular process of 
institutional self-reinforcement takes place.  In order to overcome the inherent 
problems with the system of barter, money was chosen because it was convenient, and 
it was convenient because it was chosen.  The new institutionalist literature includes 
other examples, including traffic conventions.  Once the majority of car drivers stick to 
the right or left-hand side of the road, depending on your locality, it is clearly rational 
for all drivers to follow the same rule.  Accordingly, the emergent convention is 
reinforced and institutionalised by imitation and by efficient use of “all relevant 
information”.  
 
The purpose of new institutional economics is both to explain the determinants of 
institutions and their evolution over time and to evaluate their impact on economic 
performance, efficiency and distribution (Nabli and Nugent, 1989).  There is a two-way 
causality between the institutions and economic growth.  On the one hand, institutions 
have a profound influence on economic growth, and the other hand, economic 
development often results in a change in institutions. 
 
The role of Institutional Economics in Environmental Economics 
 
Institutional economics in its many forms has influenced the development of 
environmental and ecological economics in terms of understanding human behaviour, 
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explaining the role of institutions in collective action and environmental outcomes, a 
source of alternative views regarding policy analysis and the normative basis for policy 
prescriptions. 
 
Originally, the environment was not a central concern for the new institutional 
economics, which focussed on industrial organisation and public choice. However, new 
institutional economics has spawned a significant body of interdisciplinary research on 
common property arrangements and international environmental conventions.  The 
most notable of these researchers being the Nobel Laureate in Economics, Elinor 
Ostrom. This research has covered a wide range of disciplines including economics, 
political science, sociology and anthropology, indicating in what circumstances 
environmental governance can be efficient.  It is argued that this body of research offers 
a useful and widely applicable platform for research on environmental governance.  The 
governance covers natural resources such as forests, groundwater and minerals; 
environmental resources such as biodiversity and atmospheric sinks; and the quality of 
media such as air and water and includes the governance institutions for the resolution 
of environmental conflicts. 
 
In 1960, Ronald Coase published a critical response to Pigou’s (1920) treatment of 
externalities - which are at the centre of conventional environmental economics - that 
launched new institutional economics as an intellectual discipline.  Coase (1974) later 
assaulted the second cornerstone of conventional environmental economics – the 
theory of public goods.  New institutional economics has had a unique relationship with 
the environment and, currently, management of customary common property 
institutions and research on environmental governance are at the core of new 
institutional environmental research.  Paavola and Adger (2005) argue that the NIE 
differs from environmental economics in two ways.  Firstly, new institutional analysis of 
environmental problems is based on the concept of interdependence rather than that of 
externalities. Interdependence exists when a choice of one agent influences that of 
another – a situation overlooked in conventional economic analysis, which assumes that 
agents are independent.  Interdependent agents need to resolve their conflict around 
incompatible scarce resources by defining initial endowments. This can be done by 
specifying private property rights in the so-called ‘Coase Theorem’ or by establishing 
environmental regulations, which create other kinds of rights.  Secondly, NIE recognises 
positive transaction costs (the cost of making an economic exchange such as search and 
information costs, bargaining costs and policing and enforcement costs).  They make 
informal and formal institutions necessary for individual and collective efforts and 
influence economic and environmental outcomes. 
 
Environmental economics has clung to the idea that environmental problems are 
externalities or effects between agents, for which no price is paid and no compensation 
is received.  Economists have failed to recognise ‘externalities’ as instances of 
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interdependence.  This would appear to be obvious that in the case of a factory emitting 
pollutants into a river and the holiday resort downstream, they would be 
interdependent.  Garret Hardin’s (1968) analysis of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ in the 
use of rangelands and fisheries also comes down to interdependence. Rangelands and 
fisheries are rival in consumption, meaning that resource use by one agent denies use 
by another. This has the potential to initiate a race for the appropriation of the resource, 
which may be individually rational but can lead to over exploitation of the resource. 
(Fisheries diagram) 
 
Coase (1960) acknowledged that interdependence underlies what are usually 
considered as externalities and argued that when an externality exists it is necessary to 
choose whose interests are to be protected.  He suggested that this could be achieved 
by assigning private property rights to one of the affected parties.  Coase showed that 
under the assumption of costless transaction, the establishment of private property 
rights is all that is needed: interdependent parties can reach the efficient allocation of 
resources by negotiating after endowments have been defined. This is the essence of 
the ‘Coase Theorem’.  He also demonstrated how the initial assignment of rights 
influences and could determine the allocation of resources when transaction costs are 
present and that regulation could entail lower transaction costs than private property 
rights and markets. 
 
Interdependence has two distinct sources: the attributes of the resource and the 
attributes of the resource users. Rivalry or non-rivalry of use and the ease or difficulty of 
exclusion are the most important resource attributes that create interdependence.  
They divide goods into four categories, which are called ‘private goods’, ‘common pool 
goods, ‘common property goods’ and ‘pure public goods’. (Attributes table) Rival use 
generates interdependence because use by one agent precludes that by another.  Non-
rivalry enables several agents to use a resource but interdependence arises because the 
quantity and quality of goods subject to joint consumption cannot be individually 
provided.  The difficulty of excluding users leads to the use of the resource by users who 
do not contribute to the costs of its provision, commonly referred to as ‘free riding’.   
 
The attributes of resource users such as their number, heterogeneity and social capital 
are sources of interdependence. When a small number of agents are involved in or 
affected by the use of an environmental resource, they can observe the behaviour of 
others and maintain accountability for it. Increased numbers make individual behaviour 
difficult to observe and facilitate free riding, increasing the cost of and potentially 
destabilising collective action.  The more dissimilar the interests, income levels, goals 
and values of the users are, the more they translate into conflicting preferences 
regarding environmental resources. Accumulated social capital helps to overcome 
problems associated with large numbers and heterogeneous users by fostering trust and 
reducing transaction costs. 
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As previously noted, NIE is a multidisciplinary field of study and it would be impossible 
to cover all aspects and, therefore, I have attempted to give a broad sweep of the 
subject without going into the various aspects in depth.  I have mentioned issues of 
transaction costs with its associated issues of social capital, property rights and 
economics of information, and the theory of collective action.  
 
Application of Institutional Economics 
 
In this application, I wish to apply one aspect of institutional economics, i.e. the issue of 
property rights, to an extremely sensitive and emotive debate that has been going on in 
the country for some time.  This is the issue of hydraulic fracturing for shale gas in the 
Karoo. I need to state that, as Dr Badat stated, I studied at the Graaff-Reinet Teachers 
College and during this time, I developed a strong attraction for the stark beauty of the 
Karoo landscape. It is a fragile ecosystem and I would hate to see it destroyed. Because 
of my somewhat biased views, have decided to avoid the issues that are causing the 
most discontent such as the potential for contamination of the ground water, the strong 
possibility of bringing radioactive waste rock to the surface, the source of the millions of 
litres of water for each well and the degradation of the land from the thousands of 
trucks delivering the water.  If the Karoo did yield the vast quantities of shale gas being 
reported upon, it would have obvious benefits to the country.  However, it would be at 
the potential cost of the farmers and inhabitants of the area, with no apparent recourse 
for damages incurred. 
 
The question that appears to have been ignored is the issue of property rights. As the 
law stands in South Africa, the farmers own the surface of the land, but the minerals 
under the surface belong to the Government.  The principles of private property rights, 
which make it work so efficiently are the following: 
• Exclusivity – all benefits and costs accrued as a result of owning and using the 
resources should accrue to the owner, 
• Transferability – all property rights should be transferable from one owner to 
another in a voluntary exchange, and 
• Enforceability – property rights should be secure from involuntary seizure or 
encroachment by others. 
Under these conditions, there is an incentive for the farmer to maintain the productive 
potential of the land for future generations or to obtain a good price for the land in the 
event of him/her wishing to sell the land. 
 
In the case of the concession holders wanting to drill for shale gas, they are going to 
have to go onto the farmers land.  This would violate one of the principles of private 
property, i.e. exclusivity.  The farmer would lose control of, at least a portion of his/her 
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land, which would have an impact on the farming operation.  In addition, the concession 
holders would not have the same respect for the land as the farmers, as they would not 
have a vested interest in preserving its productive capacity. 
 
How could the tools of institutional economics be used to resolve this impasse? The 
‘Coase Theorem’ provides a possible solution to the situation. In this case, if it is 
assumed that the farmers have the right to the land, then the onus is on the concession 
holders to negotiate with the farmers in terms of paying compensation for the 
disruption to his farming operation, the possible degradation of the grazing and other 
possible losses to the farmers such as stock theft.  Coase (1960) stated that if the 
negotiation costs were minimal, the parties could reach an efficient allocation of 
resources, but, if not, then regulation would be needed to lower the transaction costs. 
 
I wish to end by leaving one last thought regarding the attitude of the farmers in the 
Karoo to the matter of hydraulic fracturing – to which I am not going to offer an opinion 
- and that is “What would their feelings have been on fracking if they owned the rights 
to the minerals below the surface?” 
 
In conclusion, the preparation of this inaugural address has been a good learning 
experience for me in terms of coming to grips with the literature dealing with 
institutional economics and the environment.  It will be invaluable for our research 
focus area.  A month ago today, we had a launch for the focus research area and 
advertised it at a number of universities and through the Economic Society of South 
Africa. We have received 20 applications from prospective students, some of which have 
excellent credentials. This is very encouraging for the focus area and gives us confidence 
that it will grow into a successful programme. 
